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his issue marks a quarter century of EAP! 
We thank readers renewing subscriptions 
and include a reminder for “delinquents.” 
We are grateful to subscribers who contrib-
uted more than the base subscription. Thank you! 
This issue begins with an entry honoring the 
memory of British-African novelist Doris Lessing, 
who recently passed away at the age of 94. The issue 
includes four essays, the first of which is by natural-
ist Paul Krafel, who considers how our lived obliv-
iousness might be transformed into charitable ac-
tions. In turn, independent researcher Stephen Wood 
explores how we might become more alert emotion-
ally to the current plight of the Earth. 
In the first of this issue’s two longer entries, ar-
chitectural researchers Marco Cesario, Lena Hop-
sch and Rachel McCann use Norwegian architect 
Niels Torp’s Nils Ericson Bus Terminal, in Goethen-
berg, Sweden, to demonstrate the possibility of 
multi-sensory design. Second, philosopher Jeff Mal-
pas reinterprets philosopher Martin Heidegger’s 
understanding of “dwelling” and “place.”  
 
IHSR Conference & Website 
The 33rd International Human Science Research 
Conference will be held August 12–15, 2014, at St. 
Francis Xavier University, in Antigonish, Nova Sco-
tia, Canada. The conference theme is “Advancing 
Human Science: Recovering Subjectivity, Relation, 
Process.” http://ihsrc.stfx.ca/. The conference is an 
opportunity to explore the use of qualitative methods 
in the study of human nature. There has been a strong 
phenomenological tradition at the heart of the 
IHSRC but researchers from other qualitative tradi-
tions also frequently attend and are very welcome. 
In 2011, a website was established for the annual 
IHSR conferences by the Open University’s Darren 
Langdridge, Professor of Psychology.  This website 
serves as the network home for the conferences 
(IHSRC) and a repository for material of relevance 
to the human-sciences research community. The an-
nual IHSRC newsletter is available at: www.seat-




Left: A San Francisco de-
partment-store advertise-
ment reproduced in Jessica 
Ellen Sewell’s Women and 
the Everyday City: Public 
Space in San Francisco, 
1890–1915 (Univ. of Min-
nesota Press, 2011). “Sev-
eral advertisements, includ-
ing this one for Butler 
Brothers, showed hands go-
ing through windows to pull 
customers off the street” (p. 
36). Original from the Mod-










We gratefully thank the following readers contrib-
uting more than the base subscription for 2013. 
 
Tom Barrie    Rosmarie Bogner 
Margaret Boschetti   Suzanne Botts 
Clare Cooper Marcus  L. J. Evenden 
Robert Fabian    Kirk Gastinger 
Marie Gee    Alvin Holm 
Arlene Hopkins    Susan Ingham 
Sara Ishikawa    Bernd Jager 
David Kermani & the Flow Chart Foundation 
Anne Niemiec    Ted Relph 
Christine Rhone   Gwendolyn Scott 
Jerome Tognoli    Sandra Vitzthum 
Ray Weisenburger 
 
Items of Interest 
The 6th annual symposium of the Forum for Archi-
tecture, Culture and Spirituality will be held at 
Trinity College, Toronto, June 5–8, 2014. The con-
ference focus is “The Architecture of Spirituality in 
a Multicultural Setting.” The conference will include 
a keynote lecture by McGill Architecture Professor 
Alberto Pérez-Gómez; and a “sacred space tour” of 
Toronto buildings, gardens, and urban settings. 
www.acsforum.org/symposium2014/. 
 
Green Humanities is a peer-reviewed, online jour-
nal of ecological thought in literature, philosophy 
and the arts. The editors seek articles (4,500–7,500 
words) considering the role of the humanities in ad-
dressing contemporary environmental concerns. The 
editors also seek poems (10–40 lines) dealing with 
ecological and environmental themes. Contact: Co-
Editors Peter Schulman (pschulma@odu.eduor) 
and Josh Weinstein (jweinstein@vwc.edu). 
www.greenhumanities.org/ 
 
News from Readers 
Sarah Reagan is a naturopathic health practitioner 
focusing on equine medicine. She is the author of Eq-
uine Nutrition: From a Species Appropriate Perspec-
tive (2013). In the last several years, she has become 
interested in phenomenological and hermeneutic ap-
proaches to animal experience, particularly the life-
world of horses. In turn, this focus led her to Goe-
thean science, about which she writes: “Goethean 
science was literally my ‘return to Ithaca’–my com-
ing home.  I felt I had found a mode of science miss-
ing from the conventional education system, and I 
embraced it completely. I believe Goethean science 
can legitimately be brought into the modern world—
infused within every scientific discipline. I hope to 
dedicate professional work toward recognition and 
mainstream integration of Goethean science and her-
meneutic phenomenology, especially in animal stud-
ies and, in particular, for the domestic horse.” 
 
Volume on Place Attachment 
In 1992, psychologist Irwin Altman and anthropol-
ogist Setha Low published the collection, Place At-
tachment, a volume in the Plenum series, “Human 
Behavior and Environment,” edited by Altman and 
psychologist Joachim F. Wohlwill. Altman and Low 
defined place attachment as “the bonding of people 
to places” (p. 2). The volume’s 13 chapters explored 
how “place attachment is a complex and multifaceted 
concept worthy of systematic analysis” (p. 3).  
To provide an update of place-attachment re-
search, psychologists Lynne C. Manzo and Patrick 
Devine-Wright have edited Place Attachment: Ad-
vances in Theory, Methods and Applications 
(Routledge, 2014), a collection of 15 chapters by 
psychologists, sociologists, geographers, landscape 
architects, and natural-resource researchers. In their 
introduction, Manzo and Devine-Wright agree with 
contributor Daniel R. Williams’s conclusion in his 
chapter, “Some Methodological Reflections on Place 
Attachment Research,” that “the best collective strat-
egy for studying relationships to place remains a crit-
ical pluralist one that recognizes that no one research 
program by itself can successfully engage the various 
facets of place” (p.  97). 
Chapters in the edited collection include: “Dy-
namics of Place Attachment in a Climate-Changed 
World” (Patrick Devine-Wright); “‘The Frayed 
Knot’: What Happens to Place Attachment in the 
Context of Serial Forced Displacement?” (Mindy 
Thompson Fullilove); “Place Attachment in an Age 
of Mobility” (Per Gustafson); “Do not Detach! In-
structions for Community Design” (Randolph T. 
Hester, Jr.); “In Search of Roots: Memory as Ena-
bler of Place Attachment” (Maria Lewicka); “Ex-
ploring the Shadow Side: Place Attachment in the   
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Context of Stigma, Displacement, and Social Hous-
ing” (Lynne C. Manzo); “Comparing the Theories 
of Interpersonal and Place Attachment” (Leila Scan-
nell and Robert Gifford); and “Place Attachment 
and Phenomenology” (David Seamon). 
 
Citations Received 
Anna Barbara & Anthony Perliss, 2006. Invis-
ible Architecture: Experiencing Places 
through the Sense of Smell. NY: Rizzoli. 
 
This book is said to explore “the dense interweave between the 
sense of smell and architecture and is enriched by the contribu-
tions of designers and perfumers exchanging thoughts and 
ideas… Why aren’t odors—beyond fragrances, perfumes, can-
dles or incense—used as ingredients in the design process? 
Why is the olfactory dimension never explored by those outside 
of the world of perfume and chemistry? What is the architecture 
of olfactory structures?” 
 
Victoria Bergsagel, Tim Best, Kathleen 
Chasman, Lorne McConachie, Wendy Sauer, 
& David Stephen, 2007. Architecture for 
Achievement: Building Patterns for Small 
School Learning. Mercer island, WA: Archi-
tecture for Achievement. 
 
Drawing on the pattern-language approach of Christopher Al-
exander, these architects and educators present “patterns for ef-
fective smaller-school design (replete with photographs, dia-
grams, and practical suggestions) and offer a common language 
for all those who are interested in developing more powerful 
learning environments.” The authors identify several guiding 
principles for student success—personalization, focused learn-
ing, collaboration, community connections, and flexibility—
and then highlight patterns that include human scale, greeting 
and gatekeeping, wayfinding and streetsscapes, distributed re-
sources, safety, fitness, transparency, and so forth. 
 
Linda Finlay, 2012. Unfolding the Phenome-
nological Research Process. Journal of Hu-
manistic Psychology, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 172–
201. 
 
This psychotherapist identifies five aspects of phenomenologi-
cal research: (1) embracing the phenomenological attitude; (2) 
entering the lifeworld through descriptions of experience; (3) 
dwelling with horizons of implicit meanings; (4) explicating the 
phenomenon holistically; and (5) integrating frames of refer-
ence. She writes: “I value our common [phenomenological] 
heritage and see it as something that requires emphasis and cel-
ebration. Inspired by the fact that for many of us phenomenol-
ogy is something of a calling, I have in the course of this article 
sought to identify and put into words what it is that ‘calls’ us so 
powerfully and insistently.” 
 
Joe L. Frost, 2010. A History of Children’s 
Play and Play Environments: Toward a Con-
temporary Child-Saving Movement. NY: 
Routledge. 
 
This book provides “a history of children’s play and play envi-
ronments.” It argues that today “we need to re-establish play as 
a priority” and “to preserve children’s free, spontaneous out-
door play… and natural and built play environments.” 
 
Howard Gillette, Jr., 2010. Civitas by Design: 
Building Better Communities, from the Gar-
den City to the New Urbanism. Philadelphia: 
Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
A history and evaluation of “environmental intervention” in 
American planning and design. This planner concludes that to-
day there are three alternatives to the current dominant “market 
urbanism”: New urbanism (said to be proscriptive and norma-
tive); everyday urbanism (associated with Jane Jacobs and em-
bracing everyday life “with little pretense of achieving and ideal 
environment”); and a post urbanism (associated with Rem 
Koolhaaus and discounting “shred values as no longer possible 
in a gragmented world”). 
 
William A. Gleason, 2011. Sites Unseen: Ar-
chitecture, Race, and American Literature. 
NY: New York Univ. Press. 
 
This scholar of English examines “a variety of expressive 
American vernacular forms, including the dialect tale, the novel 
of empire, letters, and pulp stores, along with the plantation 
cabin, the West Indian cottage, the Latin American plaza, and 
the ‘Oriental’ parlor.” The aim is “a more comprehensive con-
sideration of the literary and cultural meanings of American Ar-
chitecture” and “making sense of the relations between archi-
tecture, race, and American writings” in the 19th century. 
 
Gail F. Melson, Peter H. Kahn, Jr., Alan Beck, 
Batya Firedman, Trace Roberts, Erik Garrett, 
& Brian T. Gill, 2009. Children’s Behavior to-
ward and Understanding of Robotic and Liv-
ing Dogs. Journal of Applied Developmental 
Psychology, vol. 30, pp. 92–102. 
 
Though not phenomenological but quantitative, this study is 
significant in exploring how human beings understand and en-
counter robots, in this case Sony’s robotic dog, AIBO. Based 
on 72 children’s reasoning about and behaviors in relation to 
AIBO vs. a real dog (an Australian Shepherd), the authors con-
clude that “more children conceptualized the live dog, as com-
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pared to AIBO, as having physical essences, mental states, so-
ciality, and moral standing. Children also spent more time 
touching and within arms’ distance of the live dog… However, 
a surprising majority of children conceptualized and interacted 
with AIBO in ways that were like a live dog. For example, over 
60% of the children affirmed that AIBO had mental states, so-
ciality, and moral standing; and children were as likely to give 
AIBO commands as a living dog.” The authors conclude by 
asking “whether it is possible that a new technological genre is 
emerging that challenges traditional ontological categories.” 
 
Kiel Moe & Ryan E. Smith, 2012. Building 
Systems: Design Technology and Society. 
NY: Routledge. 
 
Though none directly, several chapters in this volume intimate 
possibilities for a phenomenology of architectural technologies. 
In “Glass and Light,” for example, architect Thomas Leslie ex-
plores “the influence of interior illumination on the ‘Chicago 
School’” (chap. 6). Similarly, architect Tom F. Peters considers 
“how the introduction of iron in construction changed and de-
veloped through patterns in design” ( chap. 2). The editors con-
clude with a useful annotated bibliography, the headings of 
which are “design, technology and society”; “building sys-
tems”; “building economics”; and “building ecologies.” 
 
Edward Relph, 2013. Toronto: Transfor-
mations in a City and Its Region. Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
This Torontonian, geographer, and author of Place and Place-
lessness “traces the city’s development from a British colonial 
outpost… to the multicultural, polycentric metropolitan region 
of today.” Relph’s portrait of Toronto “draws on the ideas of 
two renowned Torontonians—Jane Jacobs and Marshall 
McLuhan—to provide an interpretation of how its current 
forms and landscapes came to be as they are, the values they 
embody, and how they may change once again.” 
 
Simon Richards, 2012. Architect Knows 
Best: Environmental Determinism in Archi-
tecture. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
This art historian examines the contentious design claim that 
“the right kind of building can transform us into happier, health-
ier, better people.” Richards covers a wide range of conceptual 
and practice traditions, including New Urbanism, postmodern-
ism, deconstruction, phenomenology, linguistics, semiotics, 
and instrumentalist environmental psychology. His interpreta-
tions are often questionable (for example, he misunderstands 
the theory of space syntax and portrays phenomenology sim-
plistically), but he does point out how the assumption that built 
worlds plays a central role in human worlds is drawn upon in a 
wide array of practical, political, and ethical ways that often 
conflict and offer little or no real-world support: “[These argu-
ments] should be handled more responsibly, with a greater 
awareness of the prejudices and value-judgments that often they 
represent, especially as no other profession [i.e., architecture] 
seems quite so eager to proclaim itself ready, willing and able 
to save the world and everyone in it. Nor would it harm if this 
discussion were held more openly, providing less of a hurdle 
for the non-specialist who does not have the time or luxury to 
disinter these ideas… from beneath the awful glutinous theory” 
(p. 157). 
 
Graham D. Rowles & Miriam Bernard, 2013. 
Environmental Gerontology: Making Mean-
ingful Places in Old Age, NY: Springer. 
 
“The environments in which people live out their later lives 
have a strong impact on their identity and provide opportunities 
for nourishing social interactions. This volume translates the in-
sights derived from contemporary research on residential envi-
ronments and public spaces that enhance well-being into prac-
tical recommendations for the design of such beneficial com-
munity environments.” 
 
Jessica Ellen Sewell, 2011. Women and the 
Everyday City: Public Space in San Fran-
cisco, 1890-1915. Minneapolis: Univ. of Min-
nesota Press. 
 
This historian examines the lives of women in turn-of-the-cen-
tury San Francisco. “During this period of transformation of 
both gender roles and American cities, [Sewell] shows how 
changes in the city affected women’s ability to negotiate shift-
ing gender norms as well as how women’s increasing use of the 
city played a critical role in the campaign for women’s suf-
frage.” Drawing on diary accounts by three San Francisco 
women, Sewell details their everyday use of streetcars, shops, 
restaurants, and theaters. See drawing, p. 1. 
 
Stephen Tyreman, 2011, ed. [special issue on 
“Homelikeness and Health”]. Medicine, 
Health Care and Philosophy, vol. 14. 
 
Six articles by philosophers and medical practitioners that ex-
amine and criticize philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus’s work on a 
phenomenology of illness that interprets illness as a rupture in 
the usualness of a person’s lifewold—what he calls an “un-
homelike being-in-the-world.” Article titles are “Homelikeness 
and Health: An Introduction to the Theme” (S. Tyreman); 
“Dwelling, House and Home: Towards a Home-Led Perspec-
tive on Dementia Care” (W. Dekkers); “The Happy Genius of 
my Household: Phenomenological and Poetic Journeys into 
Health and Illness” (S. Tyreman); “The Uncanny, Alienation 
and Stangeness: The Entwining of Political and Medical Meta-
phor” (A. Edgar); “Illness and Unhomelike Being-in-the-
World: Phenomenology and Medical Practice” (R. Ahlzén); 
and “Illness as Unhomelike Being-in-the-World: Heidegger 
and the Phenomenology of Medicine” (F. Svenaeus). 
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Doris Lessing, 1919–2013 
 
British-African writer Doris Lessing died on November 17, 2013, at her home in north London. Though she never 
used the word “phenomenology” and probably cared little for what it might mean, she can readily be called an 
implicit phenomenologist who offered vivid word portraits of human experience and lifeworlds. In remembrance 
of her extraordinary work, we reproduce several vignettes relating to place and environmental experience.  
 
 
Lessing's arriving in England in 1949 as a 26-
year-old Southern Rhodesian emigrant: 
 
I arrived in England exhausted. The white cliffs of Dover de-
pressed me. They were too small. The Isle of Dogs discouraged 
me. The Thames looked dirty. I had better confess at once that for 
the whole of the first year, London seems to me a city of such 
appalling ugliness that I wanted only to leave... (In Pursuit of the 
English, NY: Popular Library, 1960, p. 32). 
 
The freedom of the urban newcomer to be 
who she wishes to be: 
 
For a few weeks, she had been anonymous, unnoticed—free. 
Coming to a big city for those who have never known one means 
first of all, before anything else, and the more surprising if one 
has not expected it, that freedom: all the pressures off, no one 
cares, no need for the mask. For weeks, then, without boundaries, 
without definition, like a balloon drifting and bobbing, nothing 
had been expected of her (The Four-Gated City, NY: Knopf, 
1969, p. 4). 
 
A long-time insider’s intimacy with place: 
 
Passing a patch of bared wall [because of World War II bombing] 
where the bricks showed a crumbling smear of mushroom colour, 
Iris was able to say: Mrs. Black painted this wall in 1938, it was 
ever such a nice pink. Or, looking up at a lit window, the curtains 
drawn across under the black smear of the blackout material 
which someone had not got around to taking down: Molly Smith 
bought those curtains down at the market the first year of the war, 
before things got so scarce. Or, walking around a block in the 
pavement, she muttered that the workmen never seemed to be 
able to get that piece in square, she always stubbed her toe against 
it. 
Iris... had lived in this street since she was born. Put her 
brain together with the other million brains, women's brains, that 
recorded in such loving anxious detail the histories of window 
sills, skins of paint, replaced curtains and salvaged baulks of tim-
ber, there would be a recording instrument, a sort of six-dimen-
sioned map which included the histories and lives and loves of 
people, London—a section map in depth. This is where London 
exists, in the minds of people who have lived in such and such a 
street since they were born... (The Four-Gated City, p. 10). 
 
 
An empathetic insider’s encounter with place: 
 
It was a wet evening, with a soft glistening light falling through a 
low golden sky. Dusk was gathering along walls, behind pillars 
and balustrades. The starlings squealed overhead. The buildings 
along Pall Mall seemed to float, reflecting soft blues and greens 
on to a wet and shining pavement. The fat buses, their scarlet sof-
tened, their hardness dissolved in mist, came rolling gently along 
beneath us, disembarking a race of creatures clad in light, with 
burnished hair and glittering clothes. It was a city of light I stood 
in, a city of bright phantoms (In Pursuit of the English, pp. 229–
30). 
 
The “heaviness” of an old woman’s lifeworld: 
 
Morning... oh, the difficulties of morning, of facing the day... each 
task such a weight to it... She sits there, thinking, I have to feed the 
cat... I have to... At last, she drags herself up, anxious, because her 
bowels are threatening again, and, holding on to door handles, chair 
backs, she gets herself into the kitchen. There is a tin of cat food, 
half empty. She tries to turn it on to a saucer, it won’t come out.  It 
means she has to get a spoon. A long way off, in the sink, are her 
spoons and forks, she hasn’t washed up for days. She winkles out 
the cat food with her forefinger, her face wrinkled up—is it smelling 
perhaps? She lets the saucer fall from a small height on to the floor, 
for bending forward makes her faint. The cats sniffs at it and walks 
away, with a small miaow. Maudie sees that under the table are 
saucers, bone dry and empty. The cat needs milk, she needs water. 
Slowly, slowly, Maudie gets herself to the sink, pulls out of it a dirty 
saucer which she has not got the energy to wash, runs water into it. 
Finds a half bottle of milk. Has it gone off? She sniffs. No. She 
somehow gets the saucer on to the floor, holding on to the table and 
nearly falling. The cat drinks all the milk, and Maudie knows she is 
hungry. 
 Under the table not only the saucers, one, two, three, four, five, 
but a cat mess. This reminds Maudie she has to let the cat out. She 
toils to the door, lets out the cat and stands with her back to the door, 
thinking. A general planning a campaign could not use more 
cleverness than Maudie does, as she outwits her weakness and her 
terrible tiredness. She is already at the back door: the toilet is five 
steps away; if she goes now it will save a journey later. .. Maudie 
gets herself to the toilet, uses it, remembers there is the commode 
full of dirt and smell in her room, somehow gets herself along the 
passage to her room, somehow gets the pot out from under the round 
top, somehow gets herself and the pot to the toilet (The Diaries of 
Jane Somers, NY: Knopf, 1984, pp. 115–16). 
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Krafel is a naturalist and educator who is Administrator of the Chrysalis Charter School in Palo Cedro, Califor-
nia, a teacher-led, kindergarten-through-eighth-grade, science-and-nature program. Chrysalis’s mission is “en-
couraging the light within each student to shine brighter.” Krafel is the author of Seeing Nature (Chelsea Green, 
1998), which points toward a phenomenology of the two laws of thermodynamics, particularly the second law 
stating that all activities, left to their own devices, tend toward greater disorder and fewer possibilities. The fol-
lowing essay is reprinted, with permission, from Krafel’s latest Cairns of Hope newsletter, available at: 
http://www.chrysalischarterschool.com/Paul/Paul/Cairns/default.htm. One can receive digital copies of the 
newsletter by making a request at: paul@chrysalischarterschool.com. © 2014 Paul Krafel. 
 
 
 was driving to kayaking when I saw what looked 
vaguely like a man lying in the left turn lane of 
the highway. The form had the right mass of a 
person but not the right proportions. As I drew 
nearer, I still could not make out what I saw.  
I pulled off into the emergency lane and walked 
out into the highway. Even then I wasn’t quite sure if 
the “pile of clothes” included a person. When I 
touched it, however, I realized the “it” was a man, 
curled up with a hood pulled over his head pillowed 
on a small bag, as if sleeping in the middle of the road. 
He was probably in his mid-20s. No smell of al-
cohol or sign of injury. I tried to get him to stand up 
and get off the road, but he only grunted and rolled 
back into fetal position. As I tried to convince him to 
move, another car stopped. The driver called 911. A 
third car stopped and two women approached, one say-
ing she was a doctor and asking if the man needed 
help. 
In a few minutes, the police arrived. They helped 
the man up and out of the highway. One policeman 
asked questions that the man would not answer. The 
woman with the doctor tried signing to the man and he 
signed back. He was deaf, which changed the way the 
policeman related to him. An ambulance arrived and I 
drove on.  
 
hree reflections from this experience stay with 
me. When I first looked at the man, I saw in his 
eyes a broken spirit. Every year, two or three 
children transfer to Chrysalis, the charter school I di-
rect, because they were bullied at their former schools. 
When I first meet these children, they all have a dull, 
pained look in their eyes. One of the joys of Chrysalis 
is watching the light come back over the first couple 
of weeks of school as the students realize that they are 
safe and that the other kids are kind. 
But what if there wasn’t a Chrysalis and you had 
to endure an entire childhood of bullying? And if you 
were deaf? And if you were from a background where 
you ended up on your own, homeless, deaf, and bro-
ken? Would you, too, reach a point where you would 
just lie down in the highway, curl up and cover your 
head until a car crushed you and ended the suffering? 
The second reflection is about the man lying there. 
I was at a distance when I first noticed something. I 
did not see him walk out or lie down. He was already 
there in one lane of a double-left turn for a Walmart 
superstore and connected shopping mall. Drivers turn-
ing left could have gone around him by using the other 
turn lane. But that still would require them to notice a 
man lying in the street. How many minutes had he lain 
there? How many cars had driven by without stop-
ping? 
The third reflection is a sense of wonder about 
what happened when I did stop for the man. Within a 
minute, others also stopped, including the doctor and 
woman who could sign. How strange that the help he 
needed aligned in a few minutes! All I could do was to 
stop. That act, I think, led others to stop who could help 
him. The world can act in a heartless or charitable fash-
ion. In some mysterious way, we help decide in which 













Wood is an independent researcher in phenomenology and the environment. He studied systematic zoology at the 
University of Cambridge and has held an honorary fellowship in the Theoretical Physics Research Unit at Birk-
beck College, London. This essay was written in 2008, after Wood’s return from an Earth Jurisprudence course 
at Schumacher College in Totnes, England. At the time, he was living in Nîmes in the south of France. 
s.w.wood.88@cantab.net. © 2014 Stephen Wood. 
 
 
ovember has been a rainy time here in 
Nîmes. Being unable to walk far, I was 
drawn to Les Jardins de la Fontaine, the 
city’s public gardens. They are beautiful in 
any weather and have a particular calm about them. 
There the sacred spring of Nemausus can still be seen 
bubbling up from the earth. If you’re lucky and the 
wind is in the right direction, you are protected from 
the noise of the city’s traffic, and the trees of the gar-
den envelop you with their stillness. 
 Leaving the spring, I started the climb toward the 
Tour Magne, the Gallo-Roman watchtower that pre-
sides over Nîmes. After the first flight of steps, I 
stopped at a stone wall beautifully clothed with lichens. 
The brilliant orange of Xanthoria lichens caught my 
eye, but after a while, I began to see lots of different 
shades of green, grey, blue, and white. All the lichens 
were of the encrusting type, closely hugging the wall, 
but some had the saucer-shaped cups of fruiting bodies. 
As a boy, I was fascinated by this close symbiosis 
between two organisms, namely an alga and a fungus. 
Now, as I looked at the way the lichens worked their 
subtle magic on the stone, my enthusiasm was rekin-
dled. It seemed these humble creatures were the natural 
growth of the wall, its breath and expansion. They were 
giving to our human construction a beauty and a har-
mony, a wisdom and a dignity of the kind that can only 
be acquired over centuries.  
My eyes traced the tapestry of colors along the 
stone wall, feeling the lichens bringing the wall to life 
and blending it harmoniously with the landscape. But 
abruptly the lichens stopped and a message was 
sprayed in purple paint along the wall. There had also 
been plenty of snails on the wall, both a low-coiled and 
a high-coiled species, but these too were now very 
much fewer in number. 
 
hy did the lichens stop? The wall had been 
continued not as stone but as a bland, uni-
form slab of concrete. The lichens couldn’t grow there. 
I read afterward that the lichens cannot tolerate the 
greater alkalinity of the concrete. Over time, the pH 
will change allowing the lichens to colonize. For now, 
however, I looked at the concrete and felt its pain. The 
life had gone out of the wall. It was now just filling 
space. What had happened to its voice, speaking to us 
of its dignified regard for the passing centuries? In a 
way, the material seemed dumb in its blandness and 
uniformity, “a dull, brutish beast.” But I felt something 
else, too, coming from the concrete… It was as if the 
Earth lay there gagged in a silent scream. 
Believing stone to be inert and lifeless, we have 
created inert and lifeless concrete. But the Earth suf-
fers. Stone has a soul and, in concrete, we have taken 
it hostage. To me, it was no coincidence that the graf-
fiti artist had vented his pain on the barren stretch of 
wall. Was he in his own way trying to bring a beauty 
and color to the wall, since the lichens could not? And 
isn’t his graffiti the very emblem of the considerable 
alienation we have created through our modern world? 
Rejoining the climb to the Tour Magne, I stopped 
at the frog pond. My friends, the three frogs I had seen 
regularly, had disappeared. The seasons had turned. 
The water lilies no longer sported their beautiful flow-
ers and the water reeds looked dead. At the top, I sat 
for a while on the ruined Roman ramparts and contem-
plated the tower. My gaze shifted to an Aleppo pine, 
and I was delighted to see lichens sprouting thickly 
from the branches. I stood up to take a closer look and 
N W 
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spent a good few minutes enrap-
tured by the miniature world cre-
ated by these leafy lichens. 
 
 few days earlier, I had 
been reading philosopher 
David Abram’s The Spell 
of the Sensuous. As I walked down 
from the Tour Magne and back to 
my flat, I remembered how he de-
scribes the respect that the Plains 
Indians have for stones and rocks. 
When I returned home, I reread this beautiful ritual 
song of the Omaha (Abram, 1996, p. 71): 
 
unmoved 
from time without 
end 
you rest 
there in the midst of the paths 
in the midst of the winds 
you rest 
covered with the droppings of birds 
grass growing from your feet 
your head decked with the down of birds 
you rest 




One can picture the scene. There the rock sits, pa-
tient, humble, and wise. The wind whistles and feath-
ers flutter past. Occasionally, a bird alights on the rock 
but flies off quickly, the stillness of the scene unbro-
ken. As all around changes, the rock endures, a coun-
terpoint, a resting place, a landmark. Let us come to 
rest and be taken by the rock’s gentle rhythm, feeling 
a reverence for the slow aging ones of the Earth. 
How our concrete walls are so robbed of feeling 
in comparison. Would we have created such a material 
at all, if we had these feelings of respect and rever-
ence? Abram goes on to reflect on how true artists 
work with stone, indeed, any natural material. They 
work in cooperation with the material, to bring out its 
natural beauty, to enhance what is already there rather 
than impose their vision from without. 
 
his is exactly the impression I have looking at 
Barbara Hepworth’s sculptures—I come away 
a great fan of the stones and rocks themselves 
and think, Wow! Where did she find 
such beautiful objects? Londoners 
have the chance to see the work of a 
wonderful stone sculptor—Emily 
Young’s majestic, grave and com-
passionate angels that occupy the 
courtyard of St Paul’s. Her angels 
emerge from the rock, messengers 
from the realm of the Earth, bearing 
their message of pain, of urgency, of 
dignity, and unity. Looking at her 
website, I read how she only gradually became aware 
of the angels’ message, only gradually became con-
scious of the cry of the Earth to which she was giving 
voice: 
 
What is it that is happening when I carve stone? Many answers 
came, none the final one: but the best answer is—I am doing Na-
ture’s bidding. I am a part of Nature, and I am a manifestation in 
human form of her creativity; me carving stone is one of the infi-
nite ways nature expresses itself. I am compelled by everything 
that I have ever experienced, or was born from, or know about, to 
do this, here, now... (Young, 2007) 
 
In her latest piece, the Earth howls and unites with 
our howls of pain and loss, pain that begs to be met 
with compassion and tenderness: 
 
This is the howl that we all have inside us. It’s born of love, and 
loss. The howl comes with our birthright of experience and love. 
It was carved with an acknowledgement of human frailty in the 
face of death and loss and change. It’s a monument to those who 
came and went before us, unmarked and unmourned, and for 
those in the future, who come after us, who will bear the dreadful 
repercussions of the profligacy and cruelty of our time. 
After the howl, sometimes, there is quiet and peace, the 
grace even, that comes with the knowledge of how beautiful and 
complex are the people and places we loved, and lost, and are 
losing; and sometimes, possibly, gently, a surrender to the sense 
that we are here to serve the Earth, and the Earth’s future... 
(Young, 2008) 
 
Let us join in bringing the cry of the Earth to the 
awareness of the wider world! 
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n public transit, efficient movement and way 
finding are often at odds with human identity 
and environmental presence. Indeed, public 
transit often succeeds by transforming human 
beings into algorithms of movement and regarding 
their full humanity as a necessary sacrifice to effi-
ciency. The design of transit environments often jet-
tisons anything not instrumental to processing infor-
mation about movement and orientation, including 
sensory engagement. Yet sensory engagement al-
lows us to bond with a place and deepen our sense of 
orientation and safety. 
It is through the sensory capacities of our body 
that we get to know the world and make sense of it, 
according to French phenomenologist Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty, who explores the links between percep-
tion and meaning at length [1]. Current cognitive re-
search also points to the importance of embodied ex-
perience for the formation of abstract concepts. For 
example, neurologist Antonio Damasio points to the 
significance of both imagination and emotions in or-
der to make logical decisions and engage in abstract 
analysis [2]. In a related way, psychiatrist Ludwig 
Binswanger describes our orientation within subjec-
tive, situated space, supporting the phenomenologi-
cal thoughts of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology [3]. 
Furthermore, the openness in Merleau-Ponty’s sys-
tem of “flesh” accommodates feminist psychoanalyst 
Luce Irigaray’s account of pervasive human differ-
ence, incorporating a breadth of human expression 
and experience [4]. 
In this article, we explore how architecture supports 
a sense of safety and orientation by providing for rich 
sensory engagement. We describe three closely related 
phenomenological concepts that point to important de-
sign implications: first, chiasm, or intertwining, as the 
basis for creating a materially engaging architecture; 
second, a spatiality of situation, which draws meaning 
from embodied attunement to task and community; and, 
third, alterity in the flesh, a nuanced understanding of 
styles of spatial inhabitation. 
We call on imagination and emotions when we ex-
perience architecture and urban space. In addition, our 
experiences and expectations color continually evolving 
perceptions inflected by gender and a myriad of differ-
entiating human characteristics. Merleau-Ponty’s phe-
nomenology is a philosophy of sophisticated connection 
that answers to this complexity and depth. Understand-
ing his concepts may assist architects in designing 
buildings that respond to human needs in a public set-
ting. 
To illustrate these possibilities, we present as a de-
sign example the Nils Ericson Terminal by Norwegian 
architect Niels Torp. Located in Gothenburg, Sweden, 
this terminal demonstrates how one might integrate so-
cial sustainability with architectural and material quali-
ties to facilitate a powerful place ambience.  
 
Bus Terminal as Agora 
Borrowing partly from airport-terminal design, Torp re-
thinks what a bus terminal might be: a space for travel-
ers and travelling but also an environment offering af-
fordances to the activities of that place. Torp designs the 
I 
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terminal building as an agora, with possibilities for 
movement and rest as well as for sociability. Small 
shops are situated along a narrow, skylit “street” 
stretching through the building and lined with cafés, 
eateries, and benches. 
These small comforts—a warm, sunny path, places 
to sit and drink—are points of entry into a deeper level 
of engagement. These design elements provide rich, 
multisensory invitations through their material articula-
tion. An architecture that speaks to all our senses is fun-
damental to our ability to construct a mental 
image of a building or place, since we re-
member a place more fully when our senses 
cooperate in perception [5]. A multisensory 
materiality taps into the depths of embodied 
experience, establishing a space as a place 
that we can connect to and thus experience 
as meaningful.  
Merleau-Ponty posits subjects deeply 
intertwined with their worlds—an in-the-
world-being where I exist with all my 
senses. He describes the human being as 
deeply at home in a milieu in which dichot-
omy between subject and object is replaced 
by interchange. In this milieu, the architect 
creates by engaging in careful acts of listen-
ing to possibilities for meeting human needs 
through material acts. As a result of the ar-
chitect’s care, a designed space may, 
through its materiality, become a giver-of-
answers or a realm of possibilities for the 
user.  
This situation can be called a chiasmic 
opening to the world. Merleau-Ponty’s ex-
ample of two hands touching illustrates chi-
asm, as one hand engages in actively touch-
ing the other while at the same time it pas-
sively receives the other’s touch. An ex-
change, an answer of sorts, appears in what 
is close—in something that is the same yet 
different. Chiasm manifests as attentive di-
alogue with the world.  
In designing the bus terminal, Torp 
does not regard architecture as an object. 
Rather, his starting point is focusing on the 
experience of traveling and travelers. The 
affordance of space is central in the build-
ing: Space is created as meaningful, and the 
choice of materials is essential. There is a 
sense of care in how materials are used, and 
Torp’s skill with details is apparent. This at-
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tention and expertise points toward what architect 
Juhani Pallasmaa defines as a responsibility to design 
for human existential needs alongside purely func-
tional ones [6]. Similarly, architect Peter Zumthor 
identifies the link between materiality, meaning, and 
the architect’s careful design: “Sense emerges when 
[the architect succeeds] in bringing out the specific 
meanings of certain materials … in just this way in 
this one building” [7].  
Phenomenology concerns itself with how some-
thing is experienced and lived. Merleau-Ponty insists 
that we are not separate from a world that is there 
before us, pre-given, whose materiality and spatiality 
inform our every thought pattern and action. Indeed, 
we are an integral, inseparable part of what Merleau-
Ponty calls the flesh, an overarching, interactive mi-
lieu in which “each perception implies a certain per-
ception of the body … due to the body’s ability to 
feel itself as it can also feel other objects” [8]. Mer-
leau-Ponty’s notion of the chiasm describes how to 
enter the realm of relations—with oneself, with oth-
ers, and with material things. We can use the idea of 
chiasm to conceptually reformulate spaces for urban 
transport as we focus on human sensory experience. 
In this way, we incorporate French poet Paul Va-
léry’s observation that “the artist takes his body with 
him” [9]. 
The Nils Ericson Terminal extends from the 
Gothenburg Central Station, a building with a high 
ceiling that feels gloomy—almost hostile with its 
hard, clashing sounds. When we move from the cen-
tral station to the new terminal, we pass a palpable 
border. The first shift we notice is a change in sounds 
that seem suddenly muffled. People seem to move 
more slowly. On this particular spring morning, light 
filters into the building. Like a tree canopy, the 
arched roof sparks an interplay between light and 
shadow. To access bus platforms, one passes through 
transparent glass walls enframing heavy oak doors. 
The space seems open and protectively enclosing. Its 
colors shift from moment to moment and season to 
season—from steel gray winter light to the shimmer-
ing gold of a summer’s night.  
A unique ambience pervades the terminal. Peo-
ple of all sorts sit together on the U-shaped waiting 
benches that form a room within a room: a homeless 
woman and her bags; a man in formal suit; teenagers 
laughing, gesticulating, and “plugged into” their elec-
tronic devices. More teens sit on the floor in the slanting 
sunlight; one boy charges his mobile phone. This scene 
resembles a living room where the personal, individual 
sphere is transplanted into the shared public realm.  
Chiasm—a reversible interconnectedness with ma-
teriality—offers a fecund condition for artistic creation. 
It involves pointed, intensified, sensuous attention to 
things along with an attitude of participation [10]. The 
chiasmic attitude intertwines perception and language, 
emotion and intellect, body and world [11]. Pallasmaa 
describes how architects internalize a building bodily, 
feeling it in their muscles and joints [12]. He highlights 
Henry Moore’s contention that the sculptor “thinks … 
of the solid shape as if he were holding it completely 
enclosed in the hollow of his hand [and] mentally iden-
tifies … with its center of gravity, its mass, its weight” 
[13]. 
In the Nils Ericson Terminal, Torp directs his gaze 
toward what it is to travel and to be an everyday com-
muter. While we wait for a bus, our senses are stimu-
lated by the building’s light, greenery, materials; its sen-
sitively chosen scale; its well crafted details; and its en-
ticing smells from eateries and cafés. Our minds wander 
among the sensory delights, and an interchange—a chi-
asm—takes place as our receptive senses engage us 
within a meaningful place for travel through new expe-
riences that are at once stimulating and comforting.  
 
A Spatiality of Situation 
In the modernist paradigm, the body is often considered 
as a mere object topographically located in a determi-
nate position within objective space. As Merleau-Ponty 
explains, however, the body’s movement in space is in-
trinsically connected with the experiences of duration, 
energy, and movement. As he explores the primordial 
spatiality of the lived body and its original intentional-
ity, he also discloses the fundamental carnal and affec-
tive relations between the body and space [14]. 
Merleau-Ponty’s work corroborates that of Swiss 
psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger, who details the role of 
bodily identification and orientation in space, con-
trasting the homogeneous and objective space of science 
with the subjective, “attuned” space of human experi-
ence. According to Binswanger, space and time are con-
stantly and subjectively assumed by the body. Space is 
inside the subject; consciousness is itself spatial. There 
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is not one space and time but as many spaces and 
temporal moments as there are subjects [15]. 
Instead of a spatiality of position, the perceptual 
experience of our lived body engenders a spatiality 
of situation—the situation of the body in the face of 
daily activities. Bodily and external space form a sys-
tem, the former being the background against which 
objects as goals of our actions “come to light” and 
disclose themselves. Through action and movement, 
our body is “brought into being.” When we analyze 
the body in motion, we understand how it inhabits 
space because movement is not strictly submitted to 
space and time; rather, it assumes them through a 
here-and-now synthesis. 
When performing, dancers experience an ex-
panded sense of time because their temporal con-
sciousness is modified by the “arc” of the body’s 
movement in relation to an environment of music, 
stage, other dancers, and audience. In this context—
and in every architectural context—communication 
between the body and the world takes place through 
a praktognosia, a direct, practical knowledge of the 
world [16]. In the face of concrete, spatial situations, 
the body’s posture and movements assume multiple 
tasks and act in oriented spaces integrated with time. 
Bodily intention creates a space-time structure of 
here-and-now. 
In today’s culture, we are regularly surrounded 
by architecture and immersed within an architectural 
context. Our architectural environments open spatial 
experiences and enlarge consciousness by exploiting 
the body’s kinaesthetic possibilities. The architec-
tural context suggests possibilities for movement that 
absorb and engage the user, opening up a perceptive 
experience engaging all our senses. In Torp’s bus ter-
minal, entries, windows, stairs, and waiting spaces 
stir imaginative and physical movement. The body 
experiences not only distance, length, and depth, but 
also a wider sense of movement arising from the 
whole building. Many contemporary buildings con-
tain a slow, hidden movement of the entire structure, 
combining their elements to create a sense of direc-
tion and moving structure. 
In any situation, one recognizes that conscious-
ness extends beyond the present moment to incorpo-
rate past and future. The simple daily commute, for 
example, is a situated moment in time in which people 
leave temporal traces in an always changing configura-
tion. The journey from point A to point B is not simply 
a trip’s beginning and end, just as a book’s front and 
back covers do not represent its physical limits but work 
as “gates” to enter its less visible contents. The journey 
resides in what “remains and sediments” in the middle. 
This openness can be explored through spaces allowing 
an exchange of contents, interaction, and participation. 
The creation of a “choreographic” space in underground 
stations allows users to interact with other users, situa-
tions, and architectural events [17]. 
In envisioning the Nils Ericson Terminal, Torp per-
haps took this approach, designing for both an individ-
ual and collective experience in shared public space. 
When the building received the Kasper Sahlin prize for 
architecture in 1996, the jury commended Torp’s “de-
sire to lift everyday life and celebrate the common force 
that allows our society to function so well” [18]. The 
station transforms the experience of a mundane daily 
commute into something pleasurable, framing the sim-
ple bus ride with a sense of respect for the act of travel-
ing. 
The architect should consider the experience of 
space beyond a geometric perspective. To be fully un-
derstood by the body, spatial experience should be 
global, including all aspects of the senses. Architects of-
ten design and plan spatial configurations without 
knowing whether they fit real patterns of human behav-
ior. Sculptures, pictures, videos, and art can transform 
the quality of these spaces. Instead of conceiving space 
for public transit as simple crossing points, one can en-
vision a sublimated, transformed landscape. 
The notion of agora is a collective experience to 
share with others, a meaningful superstructure that 
places human beings in a context in which they emerge 
attuned to a particular time-space situation. Reconceiv-
ing a transit station as an agora has strong social impact, 
layering a public sphere of potential human inter-
changes onto the often depersonalizing act of getting 
quickly from place to place. From this perspective, ag-
ora can represent a space in which people become nodes 
in a serendipitous, interconnected place structure. The 
bus station as agora introduces a different kind of com-
munication among human beings: each individual is 
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both a single communication node linked with the 
community and also an immersed member in a global 
communication “cloud” in touch with the individual 
nodes.  
 
‘Difference’  and Public Transit 
In one way, public transit is the great social leveler. 
It strips away luxury devices and many markers of 
social status, making each traveler an equal partici-
pant. On the other hand, travelers’ styles of being 
commingle. Some stride purposefully and with con-
fidence, focused solely on the goal of arriving some-
where. Some amble, giving their children time and 
space to play and explore along the way. Some 
dream, walking slowly and barely there, caught up in 
thoughts or sounds in headphones. Some walk with a 
dejected air, carrying invisible weights that muffle 
enjoyment of surrounding spaces and people. In 
short, each person engages physical surroundings 
differently. When we enter a place with the sole pur-
pose of getting ourselves elsewhere, we tend to re-
duce ourselves, other people, and the place to either 
moving points or a channel for those points. 
A space for mass transit reveals postmodern so-
ciety’s unwitting retention of a Cartesian system that 
alienates us from the surrounding world and from 
other people. Within this system, we cast the world 
purely as “other,” leaving no means for it to be reha-
bilitated into the relational sphere. In contrast, by 
constructing a singular norm for humanity, with 
women as mere variants of men (which Luce Irigaray 
calls variants of the self-same) and a failure to 
acknowledge different ethnicities, sexual orienta-
tions, and social backgrounds, we fail to give other 
expressions of humanity the breadth of expression 
they require [19]. 
Although the postmodern perspective acknowl-
edges social plurality, its relation to human others 
and the material world is formed largely within a 
posture of alienation. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenol-
ogy of the flesh offers new possibilities for engaging 
alterity. Configuring existence as a relational process 
of self-discovery through interrogative acts of per-
ception, the flesh immerses us in a world where en-
countering people and things constantly reconfigures 
our own terrain [20]. In our spatial encounters, the 
perceived environment accommodates our pragmatic 
goals while beckoning us to wonder. In our personal en-
counters, others present new ideas and perspectives that 
corroborate or challenge us. 
Merleau-Ponty’s flesh allows nuanced engagement 
of similarity and difference, kinship and alterity. We 
give up our position as a solitary cogito to take our place 
as a thing among things, yet perceived things still pre-
sent us with ambiguities and draw us into mystery. We 
experience deep communality with other people but re-
tain divergent desires and positions. In encountering di-
vergent others, Merleau-Ponty observes that our “dis-
tance becomes a strange proximity” when we under-
stand the shared nature of the perceptual world. In this 
shared environment, we combine multiple viewpoints to 
arrive at a collaborative understanding of things and so-
cial constructs, reaching consensus that is respectful of 
difference [21]. 
Responding to the full depths of the human capacity 
to transform through relationship opens a range of pos-
sibilities for mass-transit design. Designers can foster 
human engagement with the material and spatial envi-
ronment through attention to multi-sensory experience, 
perceptual shifts due to movement (changing both view-
ing angle and viewing distance), common materiality 
(psychological understanding of the weight of materials 
alongside physical transfers such as heat exchange), and 
sensuous invitations to touch and wonder. Designers 
can accommodate the breadth of human expression by 
allowing for experiential variations. Simple efforts like 
accommodation in ability (motility, sight, hearing, skin 
sensitivity) or responsibility (for children, pets, suit-
cases, or packages) encourage this breadth of expression 
and a shared environment. Torp’s Nils Ericson Terminal 
incorporates many features that encourage sensory and 
social engagement—for example, bright colors; warm 
materials and lights; staggered or layered geometry; 
rhythmic ceiling planes; and zones of use, including 
small commercial kiosks and sheltered sitting areas. 
Too often, mass-transit spaces reduce the human 
body to a point moving toward a destination and a pas-
sive set of eyes for moneyed advertising interests. In 
contrast, good design can restore a fuller sense of our 
humanity by welcoming the individual human body and 
different human psyches within a larger shared space. 
By combining attention to human needs with attune-
ment to embodiment, design fosters awareness of hu-
man difference while recognizing the carnal kinship of 
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the material and spatial surround. One recognizes an 
ethics of embodiment accommodating complex nu-
ances of sameness and difference. 
Through careful spatial inquiry, the architect can 
understand and reveal the hidden supports of spatial 
experience (proportion, light, rhythm, texture) and 
use them to evoke a sense of spatial wonder that un-
moors inhabitants from unreflective, habitual experi-
ence—taking spatial and social experience out of the 
ordinary. These spatial moves encourage people to 
question “universal” norms of inhabiting and sharing 
space. These design efforts range from creatively 
combining social services and upscale amenities to 
sculptural interventions that reframe perceptions of 
strangers. Spatial intentions such as transparency and 
layering can partner with social intentions of equal-
ity, multiplicity, orientation, safety, and comfort. 
Foregrounding materiality evokes our kinship with 
the sensuous world and sustains our full humanity. 
Allowing for human multiplicity reminds us that 
there are many valid variants of human expression. 
Even in a space designed for efficient mass transit, 
the architect can encourage real encounter with hu-
man others and the material world.  
 
A Supportive, Meaningful Space  
Using a phenomenological approach, architects and 
urban planners can design public places that are both 
efficient and humane. Drawing on sensory experi-
ence, a chiasmic attitude helps one to enter the realm 
of relations—with oneself, with others, and with ma-
terial things. We can use the idea of chiasm to con-
ceptually reformulate spaces for urban transport as 
we focus on human sensory experience. 
The Nils Ericson Terminal is a good example of 
how the expressiveness and the emotive qualities of 
the chosen materials help to create a supportive, 
meaningful space. Furthermore, a bus terminal is a 
social space for interaction, participation, and ex-
change with others, and it should respond to a “spa-
tiality of situation” while accommodating different 
styles of being. Torp’s design admirably provides 
this range of sociability. The Nils Ericson Terminal 
powerfully demonstrates how we might design archi-
tectural space that encourages users to engage fully 
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uilding Dwelling Thinking’ (‘Bauen 
Wohnen Denken’) is a lecture that German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger gave in 
1951 to a symposium of architects and oth-
ers on the general topic of ‘Man and Space’ [1]. In that 
lecture, Heidegger explores an idea that appears else-
where in his thinking—the concept of what is usually 
rendered in English as ‘dwelling’ (Wohnen). 
Heidegger asks after the nature of dwelling and the 
extent to which building (Bauen) belongs to dwelling. 
In this lecture, one of Heidegger’s claims is that 
“Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we 
build” [2]. Building is thus seen as consequent on the 
possibility of human dwelling. Heidegger’s discus-
sion of dwelling has relevance that goes well beyond 
architectural and design practice. His sense of ‘build-
ing’ refers not only to architectural construction but to 
the whole range of human productive activity. Never-
theless, the essay does  have a special resonance for 
architects, and this is partly because it includes one of 
Heidegger’s most sustained discussions of the con-
cepts of space and place. 
The idea of dwelling that figures so prominently 
in the lecture has been taken up within architectural 
theory by a number of writers, but perhaps most fa-
mously by Norwegian architectural theorist Christian 
Norberg-Schulz [3]. It is partly his influence, along 
with that of other writers such as architectural theorist 
Kenneth Frampton, that lies behind the prominence 
that Heidegger has had within architectural theory. 
Norberg-Schulz takes dwelling as a guiding concept 
for architectural practice. He suggests that dwelling is 
indicative of a mode of practice attentive to the human 
and the environmental context of architectural design 
and therefore conducive to a genuine relation to place. 
 
here is much that is important in Norberg-Schulz, 
but there are also problematic features in the way 
in which he takes up the notion of dwelling. I tend to 
think that so problematic are some of the ideas associ-
ated with the notion of dwelling, as understood in Nor-
berg-Schulz’s work and elsewhere, that it has become a 
sort of devalued currency, and that, in many cases, it has 
actually become a barrier to thinking more adequately 
about place and the human relation to place. Perhaps it 
has become a barrier to thinking more adequately about 
late Heidegger also. 
It might be argued that the concept of dwelling ac-
tually picks up on an absolutely central element in 
Heidegger’s work, and that therefore it cannot reasona-
bly be abandoned, no matter how devalued it may have 
become. Certainly, the way Norberg-Schulz takes up 
the idea of dwelling and the way the notion may be 
thought to appear in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ is 
continuous with a set of concerns present in 
Heidegger’s earlier thinking—the thinking present in 
Being and Time—no less than in his later work. 
These concerns are closely tied to ideas of ‘belong-
ing’, ‘identity’, and especially ‘authenticity’ (Eigent-
lichkeit). The last is often taken to be central in 
Heidegger’s earlier work. ‘Dwelling’ (which does ap-









much developed) might be viewed as a development 
out of the idea of ‘authentic existence’, so that what it 
is to live an authentic life comes to be seen to be iden-
tical with what it is to dwell. 
What this actually suggests, however, is that the 
critical engagement with the concept of dwelling can-
not be restricted to Heidegger’s later work but also re-
quires a rethinking of aspects of the earlier. Any cri-
tique of the concept of dwelling cannot be restricted 
to that concept alone but needs to extend to concepts 
like authenticity, identity, and belonging. 
 
he broader engagement presaged here is exactly 
what I intend to embark upon in this talk. I also 
discuss what I have elsewhere referred to as 
Heidegger’s ‘topology’, since I will address, in gen-
eral terms, the question of place—topos—in 
Heidegger’s thinking [4]. 
As with dwelling, the question of place not only 
relates to Heidegger’s later thought. One of the things 
that happens in Heidegger’s philosophical develop-
ment from early to late and that is centrally at issue in 
the move toward the focus on dwelling, is a shift to-
ward a more explicit concern with issues of ‘space’ 
and, especially, of ‘place’. 
Indeed, the very idea of dwelling inevitably sug-
gests an essentially topological mode of understand-
ing. As I noted earlier, one reason why ‘Building 
Dwelling Thinking’ can be seen as relevant reading 
for architects and designers is its explicit thematiza-
tion of just these issues. But the earlier thinking is just 
as topological and spatially rich as Heidegger’s later 
thinking. The difference is that the earlier work is 
simply not as clear about these matters as the later [5]. 
It is not that Being and Time lacks a topological 
focus, but that it lacks a proper understanding of that 
focus and of its topological character. There is a to-
pology in both early and late Heidegger but, in early 
work, it remains largely implicit. Part of what occurs 
over the course of Heidegger’s thinking is the increas-
ing explication and articulation of this topology. 
The issue of dwelling is closely tied to the think-
ing through of what might be involved in such a to-
pology. Equally, getting clear about the topology also 
means getting clear about what might be at issue in 
dwelling as well as in belonging and identity. Moreo-
ver, this clarification is essential to any genuine think-
ing or rethinking of place, including any inquiry into its 
role in architectural theory and practice. 
Inasmuch as my aim here is to undertake such re-
thinking within a specifically Heideggerian context, so 
much of this rethinking means not only returning to 
Heidegger anew but also returning to the conceptual and 
philosophical issues Heidegger’s thinking presents. My 
apologies in advance, then, for presenting a talk in an 
architecture school that will make little or no reference 
to concrete architectural materials. My aim, however, is 
to inquire into a set of ideas that has been influential for 
architecture at a foundational level. My hope is to pro-
vide a way of rethinking those ideas so that they can be 
influential again, but in a very different way. 
 
The Suspicion of Place 
One might say that I am getting ahead of myself—that 
before we embark on any ‘rethinking’, whether of 
‘dwelling’ or anything else, we need to know why such 
rethinking is needed. What, we might ask, is wrong with 
the idea of dwelling as it is deployed in writers such as 
Norberg-Schulz? The best way to approach this issue, 
especially in an architectural context, is through the 
larger question of place with which the issue of dwell-
ing is so closely connected. 
Place, as well as space, is surely central to architec-
ture—or at least so one might think. Yet not only is it 
contentious as to what might be meant by talk of ‘place’, 
but the fact is that place has only sometimes been taken 
up in any direct way by architects. 
If one looks, for instance, to much of contemporary 
architecture (although there are some important excep-
tions), it would seem as if place is often disregarded, 
with buildings frequently appearing as more or less au-
tonomous in relation to their topographical surrounds. 
Moreover, there is also a widespread tendency—one 
that extends well beyond architecture—to view the very 
concept of place with suspicion. Nowhere is this suspi-
cion more evident than in attitudes toward the concept 
of place—and with it dwelling—as it appears in the 
work of the later Heidegger. 
In Norberg-Schulz’s work, however, place appears 
as a positive, benign notion. Place is that within which 
we dwell, within which we are at home. To dwell is to 
be located in a harmonious relationship with one’s sur-
rounding environment. Norberg-Schulz’s valorization 
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of place and dwelling is based in the idea that our 
dwelling in place grants us an identity and a meaning 
that we would otherwise lack. We find ourselves in 
place and to dwell is to have found a proper sense of 
oneself and a sense of belonging. 
Dwelling is thus an antidote to a modernity in 
which we otherwise risk losing any sense of identity, 
self, or meaning. It is, however, just this focus on 
identify, self, and meaning, and especially the way 
these concepts seem articulated in relation to place 
and dwelling, that become a source of difficulty. 
Place may be a means to ground identity, but the 
way it does this, so it is often claimed, is deeply prob-
lematic. According to a very common way of ap-
proaching the matter, place is an essentially determin-
istic, exclusionary, and nostalgic concept. The iden-
tity of place is thus determinate—a fixed identity into 
which we ourselves are also fixed. Being rooted in 
place, that identity is also taken to be rooted in the 
past and involves an essentially backward-looking 
orientation that prevents a genuine engagement with 
the future. 
Inasmuch as that identity is based in our belong-
ing within the bounds of place, it leads us to exclude 
others from that place as the means to affirm that iden-
tity. As that identity is determined by the place, so our 
own identity takes on a determinacy that lies outside 
our control. The concept of dwelling appears to de-
pend on the concept of place, since we must always 
dwell somewhere. If, then, place is an essentially de-
terministic, exclusionary, and nostalgic concept, 
dwelling must be too, and this is just what many crit-
ics of the appeal to dwelling, from within architecture 
as well as outside, would claim [6]. 
 
uch of the argument for the problematic char-
acter of place and dwelling is based on histori-
cal or biographical evidence supposedly connecting 
place to reactionary politics. Nazism is often taken as 
the paradigmatic example—Heidegger’s involvement 
usually given to reinforce the connection, both in his 
own case and more generally. 
Significantly, however, the assertion of the con-
nection at stake here often depends on a fairly selec-
tive attentiveness to historical or biographical detail. 
Thus, appeals to place operating within progressive 
politics (and there certainly are such) are ignored or 
seen as already demonstrating the less-than-progressive 
nature of such politics, while tendencies within reac-
tionary politics that are antagonistic to place (including 
forms of nationalism, authoritarianism, and centralism) 
are overlooked. 
In Heidegger’s case, there is little account taken, 
for instance, of the fact that the increasingly explicit ap-
pearance of ideas of place occurs after his involvement 
with Nazism and actually seems to figure as a key ele-
ment in his critique of the nihilistic subjectivism that he 
takes Nazism to exemplify. At the same time, 
Heidegger’s emphasis on time’s priority over space in 
the earlier work and the apparent absence in that work 
of any developed notion of place tends to be ignored. In 
these respects, the problematic character of place often 
seems to be something assumed rather than argued. It 
often seems simply to be taken for granted that place is 
politically problematic. 
 
et one might contend there is an argument behind 
the tendency to read place in this way, and in some 
cases that argument is made explicit. Philosopher Em-
manuel Levinas, for instance, claims that the attachment 
to place, which Levinas sees as exemplified by 
Heidegger’s thought, entails both a separation of one-
self from others (through the erecting of a boundary be-
tween those who belong and do not belong to ‘this’ 
place) coupled with a turning away from the other 
through the focus on the place rather than on the other 
who appears within that place—so one’s attention is 
turned to the surrounding horizon, as it were, rather than 
to the face that is immediately before one [7]. 
In direct contrast to Heidegger, Levinas extols 
technology precisely because of its displacing charac-
ter—because it frees us from the ‘superstitions’ of 
place, allowing us “to perceive men outside the situa-
tion in which they are placed, and let the human face 
shine in all its nudity” [8]. 
As Levinas sees it, the association of place with re-
actionary politics is underpinned by the character of 
place itself—place is always exclusionary, operating 
against any genuine sense of engagement with the hu-
man—and thus must stand opposed to any progressive 
politics and also to any genuine ethics. 
Although seldom explicitly invoked in any detailed 
way, Levinas’s argument seems to underlie the view of 
place as a problematic, reactionary concept. Like many 









character of Heidegger’s thinking, especially the later 
thinking—and in this manner the argument could also 
be extended to Norberg-Schulz. 
For some readers of Heidegger, however, Nor-
berg-Schulz’s position must be set apart from 
Heidegger’s. Also, Heidegger’s position must be set 
apart from Levinas’s problematic reading of place. 
Thus, Italian philosopher Massimo Cacciari accepts 
much of Levinas’s place critique but does not accept 
this as the basis for a critique of Heidegger. In con-
trast, Cacciari reads Heidegger as critical of the con-
cept of place at issue, especially as it appears in Nor-
berg-Schulz’s work, taking it to be a concept that is 
inadequate to our contemporary situation. 
Consequently, Cacciari argues against what he 
views as the ‘nostalgia’ present in Norberg-Schulz: 
“No nostalgia, then, in Heidegger—but rather the con-
trary. [Heidegger] radicalizes the discourse support-
ing any possible ‘’nostalgic’’ attitude, lays bare its 
logic, pitilessly emphasizes its insurmountable dis-
tance from the actual condition” [9]. 
I have some sympathy with Cacciari’s position 
(although I would not use ‘nostalgia’ to name the is-
sue that is at the heart of things). What Cacciari em-
phasizes—the radicality of Heidegger’s approach and 
its own critical, questioning stance—is also central to 
the account I offer here [10]. 
 
Place, Difference, & Identity 
Much of the argument for the problematic character 
of place and dwelling is based in the association of 
place with a particular way of understanding identity 
and belonging. These notions are taken to stand 
against any notion of difference. 
Identity, on this account, is precisely that which 
excludes difference. Inasmuch as they are associated 
with notions of place and dwelling, so these latter no-
tions are seen as similarly exclusionary. Yet this way 
of understanding identity and belonging is surely not 
beyond question. If we accept a connection between 
identity and place, then we can surely ask after the 
sense of identity that is at issue here, and whether the 
connection to place might not require a rethought con-
ception of identity. In fact, when we look to 
Heidegger’s work, the question of identity and the re-
thinking of identity is a central issue—one that he ex-
amined at length in one of his most important later es-
says—’The Principle of identity’ from 1957 [11]. 
In that essay, Heidegger takes identity, or same-
ness, as a “belonging together.” But he points to a dif-
ference between the understanding of such belonging in 
a way that emphasizes the belonging or the together. If 
we think of identity as a “belonging together,” then we 
give emphasis to the unity of the together over the be-
longing. In other words, we give emphasis to the unity 
of that which belongs. 
On the other hand, if we think of identity as a “be-
longing together”, then we emphasize the belonging—
the relation between—that allows for the unity of the 
together. Heidegger takes the first of these ways of 
thinking to be the more usual and as underpinning a 
metaphysical or ‘representational’ approach according 
to which belonging is grounded in the unity of that 
which belongs. On this approach, identity, the self—
sameness of the being of the thing, is grounded in the 
thing understood, one might say, ‘autonomously’. 
The second way of thinking, however, moves us 
away from the thing understood in such an autonomous 
fashion and toward the thing as already placed in rela-
tion. The belonging together of the thing with itself is 
not a matter of the simple self-sameness of the thing 
taken alone but is rather a belonging together of being 
and thing. Identity thus appears as relational—and as 
relational, so the identity of the thing is also essentially 
tied to difference. 
 
uch a way of understanding identity is markedly dif-
ferent from the approaches to identity common 
within the Western philosophical tradition in which 
identity—and with it unity also (for the two concepts 
are closely related)—is often taken to be paradigmati-
cally understood on the model of numerical unity, and 
so as exclusive of any difference and as apart from that 
which is different. 
As Heidegger presents the situation, being cannot 
be said to be founded in identity (in the self-sameness 
of the thing). Instead, identity stands under the sway of 
the belonging together of being and thing—and of being 
and the human—in which each is appropriated to the 
other. It is this belonging together that allows for both 
identity and for difference. 
It is worth emphasizing just how different this way 
of thinking is from our usual understanding of identity. 
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Typically, we think of identity as directing us to the 
thing as it stands apart from other things in its own 
self-same nature. This sense of identity has a founding 
role in metaphysical thinking—being is understood as 
itself founded in the idea of the thing in its self-iden-
tity—in its autonomous self-sameness. 
Heidegger’s account displaces identity from this 
founding role as it also displaces the understanding of 
identity. As Heidegger presents the situation, identity 
is never just a matter of the self-sameness of the thing 
but always directs us toward the thing in its relation-
ality—to the thing as it both gathers and is itself gath-
ered. In this way, identity is determined by being ra-
ther than that which determines or founds being 
(though it should be noted that being appears here in 
a way such that it is itself tied to relationality). 
Understanding identity—and so also unity (since 
the two are closely tied together)—in this way means 
understanding identity as dynamic—that is, as some-
thing constantly being worked out, and as encompass-
ing an essential difference and differentiation. More-
over, the difference at issue here is not the difference 
of two self-same entities already standing apart from 
one another, but a difference that itself arises only in 
and through an essential relatedness. 
It is this event of gathering—which is also a be-
longing, a unifying, and a differentiating—that 
Heidegger connects directly to ‘the event of appropri-
ation’ (to use the phrase employed in the English ver-
sion of ‘The Principle of Identity’)—the Ereignis—
that is such a central notion in his later thinking [12]. 
Of this event, in which both being and the human are 
appropriated each to the other, Heidegger writes that 
it “is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which 
man and being reach each other in their nature”—
making clear that this event is indeed a realm, a 
bounded domain, a topos, rather than purely and ex-
clusively temporal. 
 
eidegger’s understanding of identity as both dy-
namic and relational—and as itself topologi-
cal—is not only evident in his explicit discussion of 
identity in his 1957 essay but is evident throughout his 
thinking, especially his later thinking. 
If we turn back to ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, 
for instance, then the way Heidegger develops the 
idea of the Fourfold as the unitary gathering of earth, 
sky, mortals, and gods makes very clear that not only 
is this unity itself articulated through the differentiated 
character of its elements, and so encompasses an essen-
tial multiplicity, but those elements are themselves con-
stituted only through their being gathered within the 
‘Onefold’ of the Four. 
What is at issue is the same ‘event’ of appropria-
tion, though explicated differently and in a more explic-
itly topological fashion, as that which is invoked in ‘The 
Principle of Identity’. It is also the same ‘event’ that is 
instantiated, in a slightly different way again, in the 
Heideggerian notion of the Lichtung—the ‘lighting’ or 
‘clearing’—that is, the event of truth that Heidegger ex-
plores across a number of different works over the 
course of his career [13]. 
If we return here from the question of identity to 
the question of being itself, then what becomes evident 
is that, just as being is not determined or founded in the 
self-same identity of the thing, in the thing understood 
as somehow univocally self-determinate, so being must 
itself be understood through this same appropriative 
‘event’ or ‘realm’—through this same topology. 
The question of identity is not merely a peripheral 
issue in Heidegger’s thought. Instead, it is a question 
that lies close to its very heart. Indeed, in the introduc-
tion to Identity and Difference—the volume in which 
‘The Principle of Identity’ appears—translator Joan 
Stambaugh writes that “it came as no surprise ... when 
Heidegger stated that he considered Identity and Differ-
ence to be the most important thing he has published 
since Being and Time” [14]. 
The question of identity is central to Heidegger’s 
thought and a central philosophical problem more gen-
erally. Moreover, Heidegger contests the conventional 
understanding of identity in a way directly tied to his 
thinking of the question of being and to the topological 
frame within which that thinking proceeds. 
It is all the more striking, then, to find Heidegger 
so often read—by those who are sympathetic as well as 
antagonistic—in ways that take for granted a conven-
tional understanding of identity, thereby attributing to 
Heidegger a view of identity that he explicitly eschews. 
 
eidegger’s emphasis on identity as founded in ap-
propriation and so as standing in an essential rela-
tion to difference and relationality, as unity is also tied 
to multiplicity, reflects the character of place as both 









Indeed, one might argue that one of Heidegger’s 
most important insights is the recognition that the 
world opens up only in and through the bounded sin-
gularity of place. This is why the question of being 
must always begin with the question of the Da—the 
here/there—a Da that cannot be simply identified 
with the human even though it also implicates the hu-
man (where the ‘human’ is simply another name for 
mortals—those for whom their own being is an issue). 
This means, however, that, rather than being tied 
to a problematic notion of identity as determinate and 
exclusionary, the notion of place provides the proper 
antidote to such a notion. Rather than thinking of 
place in terms of identity, identity must be rethought 
in terms of place itself—which means in terms of 
place in all its complexity as well as its simplicity. 
It is not place that is the problem but, rather, the 
inadequate thinking of place—a thinking that turns 
out also to be inadequate to identity, which, as 
Heidegger makes clear, is not a notion to be aban-
doned. Without identity, there is no difference just as, 
without difference, there is no identity but, rather, a 
notion to be rethought. The rethinking required here 
expands to a rethinking of those other key notions, in-
cluding belonging and dwelling—that are so often in-
voked by writers like Norberg-Schulz. 
 
Place and Questioning 
One of the great virtues of Massimo Cacciari’s read-
ing of Heidegger is its emphasis on the genuinely 
questioning and critical character of Heidegger’s 
thought. Cacciari does not commit Heidegger to in-
consistency by assuming a conventional understand-
ing of identity that then turns out to be at odds with 
other aspects of his thinking or that is incompatible 
with a more critical mode of engagement. 
Heidegger himself emphasizes the centrality of 
questioning and questionability, and this centrality re-
mains even after Heidegger qualifies his emphasis on 
questioning as ‘the piety of thought’ [15] by insisting 
that it is listening that retains priority [16]. 
To listen is already to find oneself in a state of 
openness that is part of any genuine attitude of ques-
tioning—so long, that is, as one understands question-
ing not as some form of inquisition but rather as a 
mode, essentially, of receptivity. Again, this has a top-
ological inflection, for such questioning listening al-
ready brings with it the idea of singular situatedness—
an orientation within and toward—that is the necessary 
condition for anything to approach us, to come near us, 
for anything even to be heard. 
Moreover, the topology that emerges here is not the 
result of some entrenched metaphorical predilection or 
habit but is a reflection of the fundamentally topological 
character of thinking and appearing [17]. 
Although recognizing the extent to which 
Heidegger has to be read as taking a stance against phil-
osophical conventionalities, Cacciari nevertheless 
shares some of the conventional assumptions concern-
ing the idea of place and related notions such as belong-
ing and dwelling. Like Norberg-Schulz and Levinas, 
Cacciari seems to treat these notions as tied to the idea 
of a mode of being that supposedly privileges the sed-
entary, secure, and familiar. 
From this perspective, place still appears as an es-
sentially deterministic, exclusionary, and ‘nostalgic’ 
concept. Cacciari’s claim that there is no nostalgia in 
Heidegger can be read, not as directed toward the retri-
val of an alternative conception of place, but rather as 
part of an argument to the effect that it is this very no-
tion of place—and with it notions of belonging and 
dwelling—that is no longer available to us as a viable 
option for thinking or living. 
On Cacciari’s reading, then, Heidegger urges us to 
face up to the placelessness of modernity as our inevi-
table condition. 
 
et just as one cannot afford to assume a conven-
tional understanding of identity in Heidegger, nei-
ther can one assume a conventional understanding of 
place or the concepts connected with it. The questioning 
so central to Heidegger’s thinking extends to a question-
ing of place itself, and of what it might mean to reside, 
to dwell, or even to belong. ‘Building Dwelling Think-
ing’ is directed at just such a rethinking—explicitly so, 
since it begins with the questions ‘What is dwelling?’ 
(‘Was ist das Wohnen?’) and ‘How far does building 
belong to dwelling?’ 
The nature of these questions is clearer in German 
than in English, since the English translation of Wohnen 
as ‘dwelling’ obscures the fact that the focus of 
Heidegger’s question is not some strange or exceptional 
mode of being, but rather something completely ordi-
nary. When one asks, in German, ‘Where do you live?’ 
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one says ‘Wo wohnen Sie?’ Here, one is not invoking 
anything beyond what one invokes with the same 
question in English. Wohnen, in German, is a com-
monplace term in a way ‘dwelling’, in English, is not 
(dictionary entries typically note its use, beyond cer-
tain limited occurrences, as archaic or poetic). 
Heidegger’s ‘What is it to dwell?’ queries the 
character of our ordinary being in the world—even 
though it also leads toward the essential [18].This 
means that dwelling, if we are to remain with this 
English term, misleading though it is, does not name 
one mode of being as opposed to another—the nos-
talgic, perhaps, as opposed to the modern—but rather 
to the essential way human being is in the world. 
In that case, there will be a sense in which we 
continue to dwell even in the face of modernity. What 
modernity changes is the way dwelling itself appears 
and the way in which our own understanding of dwell-
ing and our own self-understanding is articulated. 
If it were the case that dwelling did simply name 
one mode of being among others—although a mode 
that was no longer possible—then it would name 
something that could only be of historical or antiquar-
ian interest. Dwelling would be something irretrieva-
bly past and irrelvant to our contemporary situation. 
It could play no role in a critical engagement with mo-
dernity—certainly not such that it would carry any 
normative force. There would be no reason why we 
should not embrace a complete and utter placelessness 
as our fate—and, not only that, but be content with it. 
Yet there is a critical, normative force that does 
attach to Heidegger’s dwelling—a critical, normative 
force directed at technological modernity and what 
Heidegger clearly regards as its destructive character. 
 
he point at issue here is quite general: Without 
some notion of that which is proper to being and 
to the human—without a notion of that to which each 
is appropriated and the manner of that appropria-
tion—there can be no grounds for any critique of the 
manner of their contemporary disclosedness. The ‘ef-
fects’ of modernity—whether understood in terms of 
placelessness, alienation, or the dissolution of things 
into mere ‘resource’—are problematic only if set 
against a more fundamental measure that derives from 
an understanding of the extent to which even what ap-
pears lost still remains. 
Modernity itself remains bound by the very onto-
logical conditions that it also effaces and obscures (ob-
scuring even its own character as obscuring). It is this 
that makes modernity problematic: It remains bound to 
its own topology at the very same time that it also prom-
ulgates its own overcoming of place, its own ‘abolition’ 
of the near and the far [19]. 
Thus the homelessness that is characteristic of mo-
dernity, in its very character as homelessness, is never-
theless still a relation to home, even if a relation of es-
trangement. One might say that the situation is one in 
which we remain homeless even when we are most es-
sentially at home. As Heidegger writes: 
 
We belong to being, and yet not. We reside in the realm of being 
and yet are not directly allowed in. We are, as it were, homeless in 
our ownmost homeland, assuming we may thus name our own es-
sence. We reside in a realm constantly permeated by the casting 
toward and the casting-away of being. To be sure, we hardly ever 
pay attention to this characteristic of our abode, but we now ask: 
‘where’ are we ‘there,’ when we are thus placed into such an 
abode? [20]. 
 
he Heideggerian questioning of dwelling is in-
tended to turn us back to the original place invoked 
here—back to that place in which we always already 
are, but from which we are so often turned away, and 
which modernity threatens to hide almost completely. 
The turning back—the Kehre—that is at issue here 
is not a turning back into the familiar and the secure. 
Rather, it is a turning back into the opening of a genuine 
questioning and listening—in contrast to the unques-
tioning attitude of modernity (an attitude that is itself 
tied to modernity’s refusal of place [21]). 
It is a turning back that involves a proper attentive-
ness and responsiveness to the place in which we al-
ways already are—a place that appears, not as some al-
ready separated, determined ‘location’ but as constant 
gathering and differentiating in which we are taken up. 
To dwell is to stand in such a relation of attentive-
ness and responsiveness, of listening and of question-
ing. The question of dwelling is never a question ever 
settled or finally resolved. To dwell is to remain in a 
state in which what it is to dwell—and what it is to dwell 
here, in this place—is a question constantly put anew. 
Drawing on the language of Being and Time—the 
language of the ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ that has 









say the authentic mode puts its own character as au-
thentic in question. Authenticity would thus be tied, 
not to adherence to some determinate inner ‘truth’ but 
rather to an openness to what Heidegger calls the 
‘event’ of appropriation—an openness to the happen-
ing of place [22]. 
What, against this background, does it mean to 
belong and especially to belong to place? Belonging 
here must be understood in relation to the idea of ap-
propriation—belonging is thus both a being gathered 
into as well as a differentiating from—and so cannot 
be treated as if it were the relating of two otherwise 
separate, autonomous entities. 
To say that we belong to place is to affirm the 
way in which our own identity and being are insepa-
rably tied to the places in and through which our lives 
are worked out. This means that we cannot understand 
ourselves independently of the places in which our 
lives unfold, even though those places may be com-
plex and multiple [23]. 
To say that we belong to place is also to affirm 
the questionability that lies at the heart of human ex-
istence. In belonging to place, we are drawn into the 
questionability of place, the questionability of dwell-
ing, the questionability of our own identity, rather 
than into some secure, comfortable residence in which 
questioning has somehow been brought to an end. 
Such questionability is itself placed, so question-
ability only emerges and takes on concrete form 
through place. It is thus that the question of dwelling, 
along with the question of our own identity and be-
longing, first arises—can only arise—in and through 
the specific places in which we find ourselves, in and 
through which we encounter other persons and things. 
We thus begin in the singularity and specificity 
of place—of this place—as that which, precisely 
through its singularity and specificity, opens us to the 
world and the world to us. 
 
Building, Dwelling, Place 
‘What is dwelling?’ asks Heidegger. This question is 
one that he takes as directly relevant to the question 
as to how we can build and the nature of such build-
ing. Building, including the particular mode of build-
ing that is exemplified in architectural practice, de-
pends on dwelling. What should now be evident, how-
ever, is that this dependence is not a matter of building 
somehow determined by an already existing mode of 
life, not even one rooted in tradition or history. 
One cannot respond to the question of dwelling 
simply by appealing to forms of past life—as if all that 
is needed is to reinscribe the past into the present and 
the future. Similarly, from a specifically architectural 
perspective, one cannot respond to the issue of building 
that the question of dwelling invokes by an appeal 
merely to archaic or vernacular forms—nor even by a 
steadfast adherence to the tenets of some pre-existing 
architectural practice, whether it be derived from pre-
modernist, modernist, or post-modernist traditions. 
As it arises out of human dwelling, building must 
always be a responsive engagement in and with the 
place in which it is constituted as building. There is no 
rule or formula determining how this is done, not only 
because there is no rule or formula determining the 
character of dwelling or of place, but because respon-
siveness, in any real sense, cannot be determined in ad-
vance, certainly not by means of any rule or formula. 
Building involves a responsiveness to place. But in 
that case, building does not ‘make’ places and neither 
does architecture. Equally, however, places do not 
‘make’ architecture nor do they predetermine building 
in any complete, unequivocal fashion. For example, 
even the built form that derives from a response to cer-
tain pre-eminent climatic or topographic features still 
retains a degree of architectural autonomy in relation 
even to those features. 
This is not only because place is itself responsive 
to the architectural (which does not mean that place can-
not also resist certain architectural impositions) but be-
cause the architectural engagement with place involves 
a relation of appropriation—a ‘belonging together’, a 
gathering and being-gathered, a unifying and differenti-
ating—of exactly the sort that Heidegger describes in 
‘The Principle of Identity’ as well as in ‘Building 
Dwelling Thinking’. 
From this perspective, one might say that architec-
ture is itself a certain mode of appropriation—in the 
sense that Heidegger uses the term—and that architec-
ture is therefore a practice whose own character as a 
practice is always in question in its practice. 
 
ontrary to the sorts of reading so often associated 
with Norberg-Schulz and others, Heidegger’s fo-
cus on dwelling and place does not return us to some 
C 
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pre-modern utopia in which the uncertainties of mo-
dernity can be laid to rest. Neither does it imply com-
mitment to some form of authoritarian, exclusionary 
politics. Instead, Heidegger leads us toward a critical 
rethinking of the key concepts that are at issue here—
a rethinking in which the idea of place itself plays a 
crucial role. 
It is through the return to place and to a mode of 
thinking that is attuned to place that the possibility of 
genuine questioning—as well as listening—appears. 
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